The peace journalism (PJ) field now has an appreciable amount of published material to show for its first decade of serious operation, in research, teaching and training alike. It amounts to a serious project to reform professional education programmes in journalism. But so far, the proposed remedies are more individual projects than coordinated and organized reforms; they are scattered geographically and do not have a global scope. This article discusses the need for a joint approach together with universities, colleges, training institutes and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organizations, if PJ is to contribute to establishing journalism as an important factor in international norm-setting and to raise the profession's ethical standards with regard to violent conflicts. To enable this, further conceptual development is also necessary. A combination of Johan Galtung's PJ approach, with insights from critical discourse analysis (CDA), offers a way of managing the demand for contextual reflexivity that has been raised in the debate about PJ. CDA offers an opportunity to address war and peace issues in a more comprehensive manner, integrating analysis of the propaganda discourses during peacetime, underestimated by Galtung in his model.
Introduction
'Democracies do not wage war against each others'. Probably this statement is a myth, but as usual with some truth (Gowa, 1999) . In any case, we will argue that more democratically relevant conflict journalism could facilitate peaceful resolutions of international conflicts rather than military escalations. The reason for this -perhaps idealistic and utopian -assumption is that the general public by and large prefers peace, rather than war, in situations in which opinion has not been manipulated by massive war propaganda. As we will argue in this article, this precondition is rarely realized, but, nevertheless, we believe that the improvements in conflict journalism that we urge for could to some degree make the public immune to the more extreme war-mongers' call for violence.
What do we mean by 'more democratically relevant' in this context? The main elements are as follows: (a) critical reporting of all parties' war propaganda, including onesided and/or unconfirmed blame-apportioning on the opponent for the dangerous situation; (b) competent explications of the legal aspects of proposals, demands, operations and threats; (c) attention to violations of international laws and human rights, including violent attacks on journalists and media; and (d) critical reporting also of peace proposals and alternatives to military strategies for handling the conflict. In particular, the lack of insightful reporting and discussion when it comes to the legal issues involved makes us believe that all necessary measures must be taken to improve the professional standards of international conflict journalism.
Alternatives to traditional mainstream war journalism
The approach introduced above is not entirely new. Our perspective draws mainly on Johan Galtung's ideas about 'peace journalism' (PJ) as an alternative to what he called 'war journalism'. As a tool for analysing war coverage and as a thought-provoking instrument for the improvement in the media coverage of war and conflicts, Galtung's model can offer new insights for reporters as well as for the audience. The PJ side of the model takes a moral and ethical point of departure, acknowledging the fact that media themselves play a role in the propaganda war. It presents a conscious choice: to identify other options for the readers/viewers by offering a solution-oriented, people-oriented and truth-oriented approach. This, in turn, implies a focus on possible suggestions for peace that the parties to the conflict might have an interest in hiding (Galtung, 2002; cf. Ottosen, 2010) . In his latest book, Jake Lynch (2013) suggests what he calls a 'global standard for reporting conflict' (Ottosen, 2014) ; it draws heavily upon Johan Galtung's model for PJ, but is also inspired by authors within the paradigm of PJ (Hackett, 2006; Shinar, 2007; Tehranian, 2002) . Lynch uses his experience in conflict zones to suggest that a PJ approach can also be used in the covering of social concerns such as the war on drugs in Mexico, post-apartheid conflicts in South Africa and the need for land reforms in the Philippines. In a critical review of the PJ model, he acknowledges Robert Hackett's (2006) attempt to compensate for the rigid character of the PJ model and benefit from the more flexible approach by Pierre Bourdieu, which allows media to be viewed as 'a relatively autonomous institutional sphere'. Lynch also discusses the relationship between social media such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube in light of James Curran's statement that television remains the most influential medium despite the smaller scandals revealed through social media. In his final chapter, Lynch presents a content analysis of conflict coverage in British media during a short period in May 2012. He also draws heavily on Dov Shinar's Galtung-inspired 5-point model, with emphasis on exploring the background to a story, giving voice to all parties, coming to creative conflict resolution, exposing lies on all sides and drawing attention to peace stories and post-war developments. Lynch (2013) suggests a new approach based on these authors and our own suggestion of combining the PJ approach with critical discourse analysis (CDA).
Apart from such conceptual and normative proposals, different reforms have been suggested over the years, from Johan Galtung's early call for PJ in the 1970s followed up by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick in 2005, to Ibraham Shaw's 'human rights journalism' credo in 2012, but until these ideas are integrated with the curricula of journalism education, they are but well-intentioned wishes in the wind. This is absolutely not to say that these distinguished colleagues should not have realized the need to reform the professional education programmes in the field. But so far, the proposed remedies are more individual projects than coordinated and organized reforms, and they are scattered geographically and do not have a global scope. There is a need for a joint approach together with universities, colleges, training institutes, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the RSF and the IJF, and the European Council and the United Nations, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2013) , with the suggestion of safety indicators for journalists. In our view, these agencies are trustworthy partners in a joint effort to make a difference when it comes to establishing journalism as an important contributor to international norm-setting and to raise the profession's ethical standards with regard to violent conflicts. A combination of Johan Galtung's PJ approach and the CDA approach offers a way of managing the demand on contextual reflexivity that has been raised in the debate about PJ. CDA offers an opportunity to address war and peace issues in a more comprehensive manner, integrating analysis of the propaganda discourses during peacetime, underestimated by Galtung in his model. The historical CDA approach suggested by Wodak et al. offers an additional dimension to the PJ debate. This perspective should be included in future teaching of war and PJ.
Below, we will take up some points in order to indicate what we think is important to discuss whether we want to strengthen the democratic relevance of conflict journalism: first, a critique of Galtung's theoretical claims with his model of war and PJ; second, the character of the new wars and their consequences for reporting military conflicts; third, a diagnosis of what is the most crucial deficit in the field; and fourth, a proposal for professional improvements.
Critique of Galtung's claims

CDA as a complementary perspective
Previous research shows that national contexts have substantial framing effects on mediated war discourses. After 9/11 and the 'global war on terror', international politics changed dramatically and new foreign and security policy alliances have emerged. In the Scandinavian region, the previous division between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members (Denmark and Norway) and non-aligned countries (Finland and Sweden) has gradually become less important and new patterns of cooperation are taking over. The Nordic countries are presently involved in a formal defence cooperation through Nordic Co-ordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS), Nordic Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC) and Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP). 1 In this article, we discuss what this new situation means for security policy discourses in the media. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between the NATO member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden, jointly presented by the two countries' commanders-in-chief in August 2007, we will critically consider how useful Johan Galtung's PJ model is for the analysis of such a debate. As complementary approaches, we propose (a) Bourdieu's theory of 'doxa' and (b) CDA because of their more sophisticated take on contextualizing.
The strategic importance of Norway and Sweden
First, some background on the strategic importance of Scandinavia in the global security political theatre. Norway, on the border of the former Soviet Union/present Russia, has always been essential for NATO; the huge sea areas between Norway, Russia and Svalbard are of utmost importance for naval strategies and the gathering of intelligence (Tunander, 1989; Wormdal, 2011) . During the Cold War, any critical reporting on sensitive military issues was met with suspicion and counter-measures. The Norwegian Freedom of Expression Commission admitted in 1999 that there were restrictions on the freedom of expression in Norway in the field of security policy during the Cold War (Dahl and Bastiansen, 1999) .
A precondition for critical journalism in the field of security policy and international conflicts is that the journalists take a distanced view of what politicians declare as national interest. In all the Nordic countries, we find periods of self-censorship at times when public sentiment is influenced by fear of a foreign 'threat' (Dahl, 1999) . Arne Ruth, the former editor of Dagens Nyheter, has pointed out the lack of interest in the Swedish press in digging into the painful story of how large sections of the Swedish media expressed pro-German attitudes during World War II. He explains that a self-critical process first became possible when it was legitimized from 'outside' by foreign reporters. Only when foreign media started writing about the Swedish contribution to the money-laundering of valuables plundered by the Nazis from the Jews was it no longer possible to defend self-censorship in the Swedish media. 2 Self-censorship is well known in a Nordic context. At various times, journalists have failed to provide public access to sensitive issues that touch the interests of the nation. Finnish journalists had problems writing critically about their powerful neighbour in the east during the Cold War (Thölix, 1999) . In this volume, we will document examples of how Norwegian and Swedish media have failed to raise critical issues of national interest on matters related to NATO and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Earlier research 3
Our earlier studies of media coverage of the Gulf War during 1990-1991, the Kosovo War in 1999, the Afghanistan War in 2001 and the Iraq War in 2003 revealed the different framing of these conflicts in our respective countries' media (Nohrstedt et al., 2002; Ottosen, 2001, 2005) . However, considering the close collaboration between Norway's and Sweden's troops in Afghanistan, and also with US and other NATO members' military forces during the 'global war on terror', it seems important to analyse how these changes were discursively constructed for public information and deliberations. A particularly interesting and relevant case here is the ongoing political elitist debate within the Nordic defence forces seeking a new role in the post-Cold War era. 4 The main question in this article is if and how these strategical security policy matters were constructed and manufactured for consumption by public opinion.
Methodological approach
The earlier research mentioned above concerning the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq were all based on extensive empirical material with comparative studies of the media coverage in several countries, including Sweden and Norway. Several methods were used combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of genres, use of sources and framing. The character of the study presented here differs from the abovementioned since the topic, Nordic defence cooperation, was not a 'hot' topic in the news during the selected period, 2007-2008. 5 The lack of news journalism coverage of this important issue in the mainstream media at that time was actually our first result. Instead of concentrating our analysis on news reporting as in previous studies, our take is on the ways in which editorials, debates and feature articles in mainstream media relate discursively to the original debate item -or spin -written by the two commanders-in-chief, which brought the military collaboration plans to public attention. Furthermore, unlike in our earlier studies, the aim here is not cross-national comparison, but, rather, comparative analysis of different types of media in order to get maximum variation, whether the material comes from Norwegian or Swedish media. Since the first quantitative result (the lack of substantial news material) is valid in both countries, the idea here is to look in more detail at the comments which followed from the initial debate article in a situation where the space for 'legitimate controversy' (Hallin, 1986 ; see also about 'doxa' below) was restricted to a minimum. The main purpose here is not so much the empirical results as such, and as representations of the conditions of the public sphere in our two countries, we would rather regard the argumentation as an explorative inquiry into the value of the PJ model for media studies of conflict communication and opinion-building.
A Nordic model?
The Nordic model is often referred to as a role model for other countries since the selfimage of the Nordic countries is often linked to the claim of putting humanitarian interests to the fore (Leira, 2007) . The quest for equality and international solidarity and the willingness to share wealth with poor countries as development aid are all included in this self-image. Norway has even tried to brand itself as a 'humanitarian great power' in its official foreign policy (Leira, 2007) . Analysts such as the Norwegian scholar Terje Tvedt (2003) have disparaged this rhetoric and image-building, claiming that the Scandinavian countries should be judged by their actual policies, rather than their selfimage. We support this criticism and will question whether Norwegian and Swedish participation as allied to the United States in the 'global war on terror' tended to play a negative, rather than a positive role on the global scene. To be more precise, we will argue that this self-image might in itself have become a risk factor for the two small countries. Ignoring the actual danger in getting involved as an ally of the United States in the 'global war on terror', by hiding this policy behind humanitarian rhetoric, the two countries could easily have been dragged into military adventures framed as peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention.
We will also consider Pierre Bourdieu's (1998) notion of doxa or the doxic room (the non-political, non-discussable room). The notion of doxa was originally used by ancient Greek rhetoricians as a tool for the formation of argument by referring to common opinions; the doxa was often manipulated by sophists to persuade the people to follow the arguments of the leaders. In Bourdieu's use of the notion of doxa, he suggests that some issues are not introduced into public discourse because leaders simply try to avoid public discussions on certain topics. These issues are, so to speak, kept out of the agenda, leaving behind the false impression of consensus (Von der Lippe, 1991). We argue that doxa can be a useful approach to understanding why obviously relevant issues such as the common risk of Sweden and Norway through participation in the 'global war on terror' were left out of the public debate when the defence cooperation between Norway and Sweden was discussed in the media. The reason for this is that opinion polls showed strong opposition in both Sweden and Norway to having troops in Afghanistan.
In (Bjereld, 2014) . Ulf Bjereld's conclusion from analysing these recent fluctuations is that more Swedes believe that NATO membership would increase the risks of being involved in military conflicts, in particular with Russia, rather than improve Sweden's security. 'For many Swedes NATO is something for sunny days, not anything to turn to when cold winds are blowing' (Bjereld, 2014: 492) .
In Norway, a number of polls in the years from 2007 to 2010 show a fluctuating majority supporting the Norwegian forces in Afghanistan, but a significant minority of 32-37 per cent opposing Norwegian military presence. A survey published by InFact/VG in August 2010 showed a majority in favour of pulling troops out (49%) as compared to 36 per cent who supported the presence of Norwegian forces (Eide and Ottosen, 2013: 24) .
Since there seems to be unity among politicians in both Sweden and Norway that the two countries should support the United States in the 'global war on terror', they apparently tried to avoid public debate on the issue by treating it as a topic 'beyond discussion'.
Critique of PJ from a CDA perspective
In the vibrant debate on PJ, CDA is underestimated. CDA has emerged as one of the most influential approaches within media studies in general and could play a vital role in research on war and PJ as well. We believe that the debate on journalism research can gain a lot by drawing more on this linguistically inspired analysis. There are a number of possible consequences if this idea is pursued in war journalism and PJ -both as practice and as an object of analysis.
If you define journalism as a discourse, this implies that the final journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. All these levels cannot then be collapsed into a singular 'manifest content' level for, as in other fields of communication, meaning is based on multilevel interrelations. This also means that in CDA, aspects of mediated conflict coverage that are rarely noticed (or not noticed at all) in debates about journalism, such as the importance of the context, the inter-discursive relations and the meaning of omissions, are addressed and integrated into the analysis. Considering that the discourse concept is defined by the institutional dimension, the structural conditions and the organizational setting are the centre of attention. This is not unique to the CDA, but coherently treated in this approach as fundamental for any reasonable conclusions. Hence, when media content is analysed, the layers of meaning related to and alluding to other discourses beyond journalism itself are of particular importance. These interrelated sets of discourses are, however, not randomly configured in our application of CDA, but, rather, regarded as constituting a 'discursive order', a term invented by Norman Fairclough (1995) . We will soon exemplify the ways in which these theoretical points of departure are put to use in our analytical work, but first, a few more comments to position ourselves in the CDA research field.
The label 'critical' has relevance as one common denominator for CDA researchers as it indicates the normative character of their project(s); communication is explored with the intention of pointing out possible realities other than that which is under investigation. This normative orientation also comes with a theoretical focus on the relations of power, dominance and hegemony. These are all challenged as obstacles to the empowerment of the common people caught in the discursive nets spun by ideologues, PR strategists, politicians and the like. As indicated above, one of the critical angles of CDA research is its insistence on hidden assumptions and latent, but nevertheless relevant, cognitive or emotive discursive elements.
The CDA field is inhabited by three different 'schools': the socio-psychological Dutch variant with Teun van Dijk as the leading figure, the linguistic British school with Norman Fairclough as the best-known scholar and the discourse-historical approach developed by the Austrian school with Ruth Wodak (1996 Wodak ( , 2001 as the leader. Since Wodak's appointment at Lancaster University in the United Kingdom, the geographical dimension is somewhat obsolete. In addition, it should be mentioned that all these 'schools' collaborate extensively and seem to regard their differences as complementary assets.
In this article, we will rely mainly on the historically oriented variant as developed by Wodak and Benke (2001) because of their successful applications of inter-discursive analysis diachronically and the insights they offer on the operations of contextual conditions for the creation of meaning in different settings such as parliamentary debates, public ceremonies, media, exhibitions and vox populi chats on street corners. Owing to practical limitations, we will concentrate on journalism as a discourse related to defence policy discourses in the Scandinavian countries after World War II. Although this is a limited empirical basis for conclusions about the fruitfulness of applying CDA, we nevertheless hope to be able to make some critical, although constructive, comments to the debate about PJ. It makes sense because a war must be analysed as a historical process starting far earlier than the firing of the first bullet, and to understand potential wars and conflicts in the years to come, we must look at the arguments in the security policy debate today. As indicated above, we are positive about the intentions and the critique of mainstream war journalism coming from the PJ movement, but it seems to us that it could benefit from an integration of some of the theoretical ideas of CDA about understanding meaningmaking as produced by discursive acts. If Norway and Sweden will be involved in future wars, we might already, in the contemporary debate, find the reason for this -not only in the arguments supporting a war-oriented policy but also in topics that are kept out of the debate. Here, we think that CDA has advantages that are not captured by the PJ model.
We contend that the CDA approach can offer the following: (a) a way to manage the demand on contextual reflexivity raised in the debate about PJ; (b) integration of the propaganda discourses during peacetime, which are mainly neglected in the Galtung model, but might in reality be the most important stage for media influence on conflict escalation; and (c) a historical perspective -especially in the historical CDA approach as developed by Wodak and associates -in which discursive uses of historical analogies and examples are emphasized. In the examples we discuss below, two points in particular are important. First, even a discourse about peace-building and security plans may turn out to be a step towards conflict escalation and should not be left out of the critical analysis. Second, contextually speaking, we suggest that even a discourse qualifying as PJ according to Galtung's terminology could, in the context of the 'global war on terror', and depending on its consequences, be suspected of being the very opposite (that is, war journalism). These are challenges for the critical media research field studying mediated conflict reporting today.
A Nordic defence cooperation?
In the fall of 2007, the heads of Norwegian and Swedish defence, Sverre Diesen and Håkan Syrén, published a joint article in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet and the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, proposing closer cooperation between the two countries on military affairs and defence issues. Among the proposals they put forward were joint military exercises, military education, joint development of new military doctrines and cooperation in buying military equipment such as warships and vehicles. In the background, there was also the recent issue of Norway replacing its F-16 fighters with a new generation of fighters; the candidates were the Swedish plane JAS Gripen, produced by SAAB, the European Eurofighter and the US-produced Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) under construction by Lockheed Martin.
The article in question was published in Dagbladet and on the same day, 31 August 2007, under the title 'Want a Norwegian-Swedish defense?' The article stated that a proposal on defence cooperation turned the traditional way of thinking about military affairs in the two countries upside down. Norway has traditionally been a NATO member, while Sweden has a long tradition of non-alignment, which is now partly broken through the country's membership of the European Union (EU).
In the original text by Diesen-Syrén, the sovereignty of the two countries was addressed immediately, but with a peculiar rhetorical twist, which did not invite discussion -the crucial question is only touched upon and then dismissed: 'We must turn all old sovereignty reflexes upside down (på huvudet)'. The issue of whether Sweden wanted to retain its non-alignment security policy could have raised an important debate, but was expelled to a historical past. Furthermore, the two commanders underlined that the proposed collaboration was 'only' about the purchase of submarines, tanks and so on. Also mentioned was the coordination of 'supply, education, training and doctrines'. The framing and tone are assuring and comforting. These new plans are only natural, uncontroversial and part of a necessary development: 'The possibilities are already many in the year 2012 and will grow further in the future'. The cooperation would not restrict freedom of action. On the contrary, it would improve relations: 'A deeper Swedish-Norwegian collaboration provides opportunities to make our production of military forces more efficient. In this way we can strengthen our common influence within the entire European and Euro-Atlantic security co-operation'. This point was elaborated further:
Stronger co-operation between Sweden and Norway is therefore a complement to the present collaboration structures in NATO and the EU. It facilitates the national operative capacity for both of us at the same time as it prepares the ground for increased freedom of political action in the future.
In terms of macro-theme, the article stated that military cooperation would make it possible to finance the production and purchase of defence equipment. By the disposition and the selection of words and expressions, the cooperation was described as economically necessary and politically desirable. It was furthermore presented as entirely natural and uncontroversial, as 'of course nothing new'; 'both sides … will certainly keep their full national right to make decisions about the uses of the forces'; it has 'strong political support in both our countries'. However, a certain urgency was indicated because a choice of direction had to be decided:
We now wish to get a clear and broad political mandate to proceed from idea to action. The time is short. In both our countries the defense forces face challenges in the coming years that make decisions about the direction urgent.
In an attached interview, Sverre Diesen stated that he foresaw no major practical problems with the proposal and that he regarded it as a challenge to the politicians in the two countries. He further mentioned that he had sent a written proposal to the Norwegian defence minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, claiming that it was now up to the politicians to decide how close the future defence cooperation between the two countries should be. He stressed that the proposal did not include the controversy over Norway's choice of a new generation of fighter planes.
The controversy over the JSF
On 20 November 2008, the Norwegian parliament, after a short debate, made the inprinciple decision to buy the US Lockheed Martin JSF as the Norwegian fighter plane of the future. The decision came after a long process in which the Swedish Saab Gripen was also a candidate. It was highly relevant to the debate on closer Nordic defence cooperation. The Swedish government was involved in the marketing efforts to convince the Norwegian politicians to choose the Swedish plane; included in the proposed contract was a comprehensive plan for industrial, economic and military cooperation, and a Norwegian decision to buy the Swedish plane would obviously have been an important step in strengthening Nordic cooperation. It would also have meant a more independent role for Norway within the US-Norwegian relationship and in NATO. The issue also caused controversy in the coalition government in Norway as the SV (the socialist left party) had, earlier in the process, been in favour of the Swedish/Nordic solution, while the AP (the social democrats) supported the American solution. However, in the final vote in the Stortinget, the SV supported the decision to choose the JSF. In 2012, a unified Norwegian parliament finally voted to go for the JSF.
The decision was met with disbelief from the Swedish government and the Swedish media, who had problems understanding the Norwegian decision since, according to estimates, the Swedish Gripen plane would have been cheaper and an important step towards stronger Nordic defence cooperation. In Norway, the public debate and media coverage was a confusing exercise. Government spokespersons insisted that the JSF was cheaper and more suited to fulfilling Norway's military commitments in international operations. This could have given the Norwegian media a reason to go into critical coverage of the whole process, but, once again, the mainstream media closed ranks with the government in security policy issues -with the exception of Aftenposten, where the journalist Kjell Dragnes wrote several disapproving articles. The independent Norwegian defence analyst John Berg (2009) reckoned that even the official US figures conceded that the Swedish Gripen solution was the cheapest. The Norwegian Ministry of Defence succeeded in the parliamentary debate after which, on 20 November, the government claimed that 48 JSF planes could be purchased for 18 billion NOK and would thus be cheaper than the Swedish Gripen. In the government report to parliament a month after the decision was made, it was, however, concluded that 56 JSF planes would cost 42 billion NOK, which was more expensive than the Gripen. Again, the mainstream media avoided confronting the government over the manipulation of prices and other facts, including the estimated life expectancy of both the Gripens and the JSFs (Berg, 2009) . After the decision was taken, several of the countries involved in the project got cold feet and withdrew when it became clear that the whole project would be delayed and much more expensive than estimated. In April 2013, the Norwegian broadcasting company NRK-Brennpunkt documented that Norway was the only country involved in the project that had not had a critical political debate about the problems in the JSF project.
One important aspect of this debate was that the US government had clearly stated that the JSF fit into its global military strategy. The supporters of the Gripen claimed that it was better fitted for the defence of the Norwegian coastline and that it was Norway's close alliance with the United States in the 'global war on terror' that made it necessary to buy JSFs.
A few weeks after the Norwegian decision to buy JSFs, the former foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, tried in a public speech to launch again the idea of Nordic defence cooperation, but without much response from the Swedish media (Berg, 2009 ). The Nordic defence concept was still alive in rhetoric from the Norwegian commanderin-chief, Sverre Diesen. In an article in Aftenposten on 12 January 2009, under the title 'Why Nordic defense co-operation?', he again argued strongly for the common use of military equipment: 'Thus, Norway, Sweden and Finland in the future will be able to operate the same types of tanks, infantry and field artillery'. Interestingly, Diesen did not even mention, not with a single word, the Norwegian decision, two months earlier, to buy the American JSF planes.
Obviously, Norway had made its choice to maintain its position as a loyal ally of NATO and the United States in the 'global war on terror'. Sweden's dilemma -to play a role in the 'global war on terror', yet also be an independent player in the industrial military market for a while -led to friction with the Norwegian government. Once again, the doxa of the mainstream media made it almost impossible to confront the political and military elite on a major security and foreign policy issue and the debate in the Swedish and Norwegian media was reduced to a nationalistic quarrel between two neighbours. In both Sweden and Norway, the unifying strategic interest seemed to be the intention to continue as brothers in arms on the battlefields of Afghanistan, which therefore did not become an issue in this debate.
In retrospect: Wilhelm Agrell's analysis and critique of the Nordic countries' partnership in the ISAF operation
In retrospect, the silence over the Afghanistan ISAF mission in the 2007-2009 articles about increased defence cooperation between the Nordic countries was no coincidence. Nor was the absence of debate in the media. The official political doxa did not allow it, and this ignorance and lack of concern were later revealed to be part of a process that led to Sweden becoming involved in an undeclared war after almost 200 years of peace.
The decisive step was taken when the UN mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, merged with the US-UK Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2009. The two missions had previously been officially kept apart, although the ISAF mission actually started as a support to the OEF for Denmark and Norway (Agrell, 2013: 74 ff.) . When both missions were coordinated under US military command and directed as a counter-insurgency strategy in 2009, the entire Afghanistan operation was transformed into outright war. Legally, the Nordic countries participated, from that point in time, not in any peace-building operations under Chapter VI but in so-called peace enforcement' operations regulated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the war laws under the Geneva Convention and its protocols (Agrell, 2013: 79, 283) .
However, neither government wanted to make that clear to their electorates or to the members of parliament. Instead, in Sweden, for example, the government's 2010 bill of further contributions to the ISAF operations obscured the real character of this support by rhetoric that Wilhelm Agrell (2013) , an expert in intelligence analysis, describes as manipulative in a way which gave the proceedings an Orwellian meaning: '… that ISAF had geared to full-scale counter insurgency in Afghanistan was known worldwide, but is portrayed as unknown in the government office and parliament ' (p. 332, authors' translation) . How can this be explained and what was the Afghanistan War actually about?
The objectives, or different 'wars', that ISAF was said to achieve from the start in the Bonn Accord of 2001 (i.e. security and development for the Afghan people, ending the corruption and opium production) have not been achieved (Agrell, 2013: 302 ff.) . But Agrell's analysis reveals a hidden agenda that is more important for the participant countries than the declarations of peace, security and development in Afghanistan. According to his analysis, the Iraq War of 2003 had thrown NATO into a crisis as important members France, Germany and Turkey opposed the intervention and refused to participate. This put even more responsibility on NATO:
For NATO Afghanistan increasingly became a decisive commitment, but it had less to do with the goals from the Bonn Accord to stabilize and to build up the country than to prove the alliance's credibility and thereby its continuance. Afghanistan simply became the joint operation that was expected to mend the wounded alliance and at the same time demonstrate its relevance outside the earlier European core area, hopefully without creating excessively large and difficult political and military problems at the same time. (Agrell, 2013: 108-109, authors' translation) Agrell points to the fact that it was not the United States but the Nordic NATO members Denmark and Norway that referred to the mutual protection clause in the alliance's treaty as motivation for joining first OEF and then ISAF. For Sweden, not a member of NATO but of the Partnership for Peace, this development implied a kind of security political lever by which '… a functional co-operation with NATO step by step was established without having to bring up the formal Swedish non-alignment policy to open reconsideration'. Thus, in Agrell's analysis, the security situation was similar for the Nordic countries, irrespective of membership in NATO after, first, the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and, second, in connection with the Iraq War 2003: '… basically Sweden was in the same situation as its neighbor countries: it was pay-back time, time to make a symbolic indication from the Swedish side too'. Because of its functional dependence on the alliance, of which it was not a member, Sweden was as keen on mending the NATO crisis as its neighbours. From this point of view, the political conclusion would probably have been that the Afghanistan war was a success:
Maybe the Afghanistan policy was, from the start, more about the forms; about unity behind the formula 'in together, out together'; about showing that the only existing Western security structure functions after all; and that individual countries join in and offer their tributes more symbolically than in reality. In this perspective Afghanistan is not necessarily a defeat, nor even a fiasco, especially not if the common narrative can be brought to a happy ending where the exodus is pursued according to plans and in controlled forms.
As brothers in arms, Norway and Sweden contributed to ease the NATO crisis after the Iraq War debacle. Another hidden agenda to which the Nordic troops contributed was the continual presence (and probably after 2014 as well) in Afghanistan of US forces in separate enclaves like the enormous Marmal base (Agrell, 2013: 312) .
In retrospect, the main lesson seems to be that waging war, whether or not it is called a peace operation, is a threat to democracy because of the manipulation and lack of transparency that follows it.
The universal de-democratizing forces of war were appearing here, and this is one of the most important lessons from the Swedish Afghanistan mission, not primarily for political agencies and authorities, but for the Swedish self-understanding of the consequences of waging war. (Agrell, 2013: 333) This applies also to the articles from 2007 to 2009 about defence collaboration between the Nordic countries. There is much talk about international peace and security in them, but in practice, the suggested military reforms were all part of a policy that led to participation in a war about which the general public was not informed and over which they had no influence.
Summary and conclusion
The PJ model suggested by Johan Galtung is a useful tool as a checklist for journalists and peace researchers. Since Galtung's approach is somewhat rigid, it has its obvious limitations and should thus be supplemented with other methods and theories. We suggest that Bourdieu's notion on doxa and the CDA approach could be such supplements. Although the question of audiences as active contributors to the public discourse on war and peace has been addressed in some recent research, the general impression is that a more sophisticated meaning/theoretical point of view would help to bring the debate to a more reflexive understanding of the achievements and limits of the PJ programme (Kempf, 2007: 4) . The CDA approach in media studies incorporates levels of meaning and the relations between different actors in the discourse analysis as part of the context. The public debates in society influence media texts as do the discourses among politicians, public relations firms and spin doctors, and vice versa. In particular, the CDA perspective helps to explore the ways in which mediated discourses are interrelated with, for example, national and transnational security policy discourses. In the empirical examples discussed above, the silence around certain critical aspects of the plans for closer military cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden and the hidden assumptions concerning the wider context of the US-led 'global war on terror' are such important -although discursively absent -inter-discursive relations. Another example is the silence over the Norwegian satellite station at Svalbard that might be a violation of the Svalbard Treaty.
Our point is that this silence (or doxa) about potential conflict risks and possible involvement in future wars is not reflected in Galtung's model for war and PJ. On the contrary, by ignoring the potential conflict risks of deeper involvement in the 'global war on terror', the journalistic examples above would, in some respects, be categorized as PJ and in other respects as war journalism. For example, although there is an appeal to a common Nordic peaceful 'we' identity, there is no opposite 'them' identity or enemy image mentioned in the reports about the proposal for Nordic military collaboration, which would classify the reporting as a case of PJ; it puts the emphasis on preventing future wars, albeit by military means. On the other hand, the media discourse on the proposal makes the potential conflict risks 'opaque and secret'; it is 'elite oriented' and it definitely does not 'uncover all cover-ups' (Galtung, 2002) , which would place it as spin in the war journalism category.
In addition, we claim that the great variety of positions and points of view of the public does not fit into either the war column or the peace column in Galtung's model (for details, see Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2014) . The elite position in Galtung's war model is represented by the military and the politicians, but the systematic avoidance of mention of conflict risks, which may facilitate a process towards military conflict escalation, is not considered by the model. The reason for this is mainly that the Galtung model is generally limited to the stage of open warfare, while we would like to draw attention to the need for expanding the analysis to the earlier stages in the conflict escalation processes.
The discourse among ordinary people, though, might pick up historical links, like the suggestion after World War II of a Nordic solution as an alternative to NATO for the Scandinavian countries, but could also address scenarios other than that promoted by the elites. New digital media offer an opportunity for the public to forward such positions in opposition to the mainstream media. However, these comments from vox populi, according to our findings (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2014) , are more ironic jokes than part of a serious discussion about the possible negative consequences of increased military collaboration. In any case, we suggest that the multi-media landscape, with its different discursive spaces, should also have a place in the future debate on PJ.
Models such as Galtung's are probably not relevant in all conflict situations and stages. Used as a tool for assessing the journalistic contributions to conflict resolutions, they are not without problems because they are generalized, although not properly contextualized. At the same time, it must be admitted that there is ample empirical evidence that much of the war reporting in mainstream media is constructed along the lines Galtung suggests. By using CDA as a supplement, we suggest a more comprehensive analysis which includes the systematic silencing of certain crucial aspects as well as the voices of ordinary people in the public discourse on war and peace issues -with the objective of identifying the complex discursive constructions and structures that contribute to conflict escalations and wars.
We suggest the following:
1. Galtung's two polarized models have heuristic value for a reflexive evaluation of journalistic practices -both internally within the trade and by interested people (media researchers and audiences) outside the profession. But they do not contain any recipes in any other ways. 2. As a 'philosophy', PJ is far too narrowly defined and could be replaced by some more appropriate term: for example, 'consequence-ethical reflexivity' which, in our view, more appropriately expresses the kernel of the PJ programme. 3. The PJ model may gain from being combined with Bourdieu's theory of 'doxa' together with CDA or other context-oriented methods for analysis of and discussions about what discursive constructions are best at satisfying the requirements of a responsible and consequentially reflexive journalism.
4. This should extend the application field and imply that the role of journalism in the advent of conflicts (i.e. the discursive handling of conflict risks) is exposed to critical examination.
To return to the perhaps naïve idea that democracies do not wage war against each other, we conclude by way of modifying it. First, in democracies, the doxa for public conflict discourses does not allow explicit talk about waging 'war' -it is called all sorts of euphemisms. Second, media and journalists who do not criticize this and make it an issue for public discussion are themselves security risks.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
